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Abstract 
While the infosec economics literature has begun to investigate the stock market impact of security 
breaches and vulnerability announcements, little more than anecdotal evidence exists on effects of 
privacy breaches.  In this paper we present the first comprehensive analysis of the impact of a 
company’s privacy incidents on its market value. We compile a broad data set of instances of 
exposure of personal information from a failure of some security mechanism (hacking, stolen or 
lost equipment, poor process, and others) and we present the results of various empirical 
analyses, including event study analysis. We show that there exists a negative and statistically 
significant impact of data breaches on a company’s market value on the announcement day for the 
breach. The cumulative effect increases in magnitudes over day following the breach 
announcement, but then decreases and loses statistical significance. We also present regression 
analyses that aim at disentangling the effects of a number of factors on abnormal stock returns 
due to reported breaches. Finally, we comment on the differences between the impact of the 
security breaches already described in the literature, and the privacy breaches described here.  
 
Keywords:  Privacy, information security, economics, finance, event studies 
 
Introduction 
A common motivation for corporations to invest in information security is to safeguard their confidential data as 
well as their customers’ personal information. Over the past few years, privacy incidents have been announced 
frequently enough to question whether firms have the necessary incentives to safeguard consumer information. This 
paper moves towards an understanding of these incentives by measuring market reaction to privacy breaches. 
Several recent studies (Campbell et al.. [2003], Hovava and D’Arcy [2003], Cavusoglu et al.. [2002], Kannan et al.. 
[2004], and Telang and Wattal [2006]) have explored the impact that announcements of various security breaches 
have on a company’s market value. Such announcements have often – but not always – had a significant and 
negative impact. Much less explored is the link between a company’s stock price and incidents that affect the 
privacy of its customers. These incidents may be related to security vulnerabilities on a company’s server, but 
extend well beyond the events already studied in that literature: they may include the intentional but illegal sale of 
consumer data; the loss of equipment containing sensitive consumers’ or employees’ information; or other instances 
in which companies were found in flagrant intrusions or violation of other parties’ private data. Little is known 
about the more general consequences of such incidents on other measures of a company’s performance, such as 
sales, revenues, or profitability.  
Currently, there is only scattered evidence about the price companies pay for their privacy debacles.  In a few 
notable but rare instances the offending company was subject to public outrage and hardly quantifiable reputation 
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losses (in the Amazon “price discrimination” experiment, for example, see Acquisti and Varian [2005]; or in the 
RealNetworks case,  see Acquisti [2004]). In the case of Choicepoint, after involuntary allowing criminals to access 
over 163,000 consumer credit reports, the company was forced to pay a $15 million fine (against $143 million 2005 
earnings). In other cases some companies have been punished harshly by the market: ChoicePoint’s own stock 
tumbled in a few weeks after the incident from $46.01 to $37.64; while Internet advertising company DoubleClick 
lost 20% of its market value in March 2000 after the storm generated by privacy concerns associated with its 
acquisition of Abacus Direct, an offline consumer data company specialized in purchasing habits (Sakalosky 
[2002]).  
Such extreme market consequences however are not common and often short-lived. A year after the incident, 
ChoicePoint stock was trading at pre-breach levels. Data collection, processing, and retention continue to grow as 
business components. Although recent surveys report a negative attitude among consumers against firms that have 
exposed their information (Ponemon [2005]), there is little evidence that the professed retaliation against offending 
companies have actually taken place.  
The complex chain of consumers’ data manipulation further complicates attempts to understand the consequences of 
privacy incidents. Some companies that have compromised consumers’ data do not interact directly with those 
consumers; they are intermediaries or infomediaries (Hagel and Rayport [1997]), shielded from immediate 
consumer reaction. In addition, as news of privacy invasions and data breaches become more and more common, no 
related noticeable spike has yet been detected among identity theft and frauds (see Cate [2005]). Claims to the FTC 
about identity theft have held steady from 2004 to 2005. Moreover, the daily bulletin of data exposure may have 
started generating audience fatigue and reduced attention. Finally, announcements of privacy breaches in the media 
are often scattered and vague, often exhibiting a progression of articles and wires that slowly clarify the nature and 
scope of the breach.  
This paper identifies a set of privacy incidents that stem from various forms of security, policy, or business failures, 
and discusses their possible consequences. We focus our empirical analysis on a specific type of violation – data 
breaches – and on available stock market data. Specifically, we perform cross-tabulations, event study analyses, and 
regression analyses on the stock prices of public companies involved in data breaches. We show that there exists a 
negative and statistically significant impact of data breaches on a company’s market value on the announcement day 
for the breach. However, we also show that such impact is lower than those observed in the literature for security 
vulnerabilities (from viruses, to hacking, to exploits discovered in applications). This dichotomy implies a different 
market perception, and possibly a discounting of the consequences of incidents that directly compromise consumers’ 
data compared to those that affect consumers or corporations through viruses, denial-of-service attacks, and software 
vulnerabilities. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the Section “Privacy incidents” we discuss the relationship between 
privacy and security, as well as the possible consequences of a privacy incident for a firm’s profitability and 
performance. In the Section “Hypotheses” we discuss the empirical hypotheses that drive our research. In the 
Section “Privacy breaches: Empirical analysis” we focus on a particular form of privacy incident, consisting of 
breaches of consumers’ privacy – be it stolen, hacked, or illegally sold, or unscrupulously handled data. In that 
section we presents the results of various empirical analyses, including an event study approach. In the Section 
“Discussion” we analyze our initial results and present some basic regression models. In the Section “Conclusion” 
we discuss current paths of analysis. 
 
Privacy Incidents 
As the amount of personal data stored and processed by companies increases, so too does the complexity of the 
information systems required for its safe-keeping. This data trend is also correlated with an increase in the number 
of privacy incidents. We broadly define a privacy incident as an event involving misuse of individuals’ personal 
information. This misuse can consist of illegal sales or usage or lack of protection. It can be criminal, commercial, or 
ultimately innocuous. It can be intentional or unintentional. It can involve customers’ or employees’ data.  
Privacy incidents add a unique dimension to discussions of privacy. As has been noted in countless other thoughtful 
articles, attempts to precisely define the concept of “privacy” have proven fruitless. Introna and Pouloudi (1999) 
subsume many definitions under the idea of “freedom from judgment of others” but data disclosure does not always 
create such a potential. The unifying feature of privacy incidents is the violation of certain expectations about how 
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data will be handled. Moor (1997) unifies several privacy theories into a concept of “control/restricted access” 
where an individual has an expectation of being able to control the flow of personal information, and restrict access 
where appropriate. This is reflected in the empirical work of Smith et al. (1996) who show that unauthorized access 
and secondary use are two of the four primary factors in their concern for information privacy construct, a finding 
that remains robust across time (Stewart and Segars 2002).  Proper treatment of consumer information is part of an 
“implied social contract” with the customer (Milne and Gordon 1993).  A promise of fair information practice can 
override strong consumer preferences against sharing information (Culnan and Artmstrong 1999) so a violation of 
that promise is a breach of the privacy conceptualization of “control/restricted access”. 
Incidents can take many forms. In 1999, for example, RealNetworks admitted that it monitored the listening habits 
of its users, despite failing to mention this in its privacy policy. This incident was a violation of the understanding 
users have about what the company terms legitimate use; since it was not in the policy, their monitoring was a form 
of misuse. When DoubleClick, an Internet marketing firm that tracks users across Web sites, moved to purchase 
Abacus Direct, an offline purchasing data company, many objected; the point of contention was the linking of online 
and offline identities. Amazon’s brief attempt to track consumer data to offer differential prices was also met with  
strong opposition; here the problem was an application of data for price discrimination, which many people 
inherently find objectionable (Kahneman et al.. [1986]). Choicepoint’s misuse was blatant, as the company 
authenticated untrustworthy parties to access credit reports. Failure to protect data can be less severe, such as the 
recent spate of lost backup tapes by Time-Warner and others, but still evinces a significant gap between the 
expectations of data protection and the execution by the controlling party.  
Each of these privacy incidents has different cause and can have a different set of effects. The common theme is the 
misuse of personal information. A subset of privacy incidents can be attributed to a failure of information security. 
Here, we define “security” more broadly than previous empirical work, claiming that a privacy incident is a 
”security motivated” when a mechanism designed to protect personal information fails. This failure could be 
technical (a direct attack by malicious actors), managerial (failure to patch a known vulnerability), organizational 
(incomplete protections), or human (data left on a stolen laptop). In the examples above, DoubleClick and Amazon 
took active steps to misuse information which they saw as legitimate, so these incidents would not be examples of 
security failure; Choicepoint and Time-Warner had a failure of protection, where the security of personal 
information was inadequate or incomplete. Note that not all the incidents are the result of an intentional attacks by 
malicious entities on data or systems – in fact, those (which are the focus of the current infosec economics literature 
and existing event study approaches) tend of be the minority.  
 
Consequences of Incidents  
Later in this paper we examine a particular consequence of a privacy incident: the effect of announcement of data 
breaches on stock value. However, each incident can have numerous consequences, with complex repercussions. To 
date, there exists little solid research on the effects of privacy incidents, although anecdotal evidence can be 
combined with basic surveys to highlight some ramifications. Of course, every incident will be different, and will 
affect the firm and the consumer accordingly.  
Even if the consequences of a violation are significant for a firm, the cost to consumers may not be fully considered 
by the firm as part of its risk. In this case, a privacy incident is a negative externality that natural incentives cannot 
correct. Moreover, a lack of complete information about how companies protect personal information provides 
insufficient signals for consumers to correct this imbalance themselves.  
Consumers  
The predominant harm for consumers following a breach is the risk of impersonation, fraud, or identity theft. A full 
exploration of this topic is outside the scope of this paper. One often-cited Federal Trade Commission (FTC) survey 
puts the number of victims in 2003 near 10 million and the total economic losses in the billions of dollars (Federal 
Trade Commission [2003]). However, as Cate [2005] points out, these figures include a wide range of activities and 
may not be accurately sampled or reported. The Identity Theft Resource Center [2005] follows a sample of self-
reported victims and reports very high costs in terms of time and money. Apart from the issues of sample bias, this 
survey claims that less than 50% of the perpetrators were unknown to the victims, indicating that corporate privacy 
incidents may not play the largest role in this type of fraud. Nonetheless, even when no actual fraud directly follows 
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from a breach, the victim may be at an increased risk of phishing (Reilly [2006]). In addition, the standard 
precautions that experts advise consumers to take to avoid or following a privacy incident (Privacy Rights 
Clearinghouse [2006]) impose nontrivial costs in time and effort – and do not guarantee protection or reparation.  
Consumers suffer less tangible harms as well. Perceived privacy risk can be as important as real privacy risks, and 
demand commensurate protection (Raab and Bennett 1998), so even the fear of privacy harms can be counted as a 
consequence for the loss of control and access restriction discussed above. As noted above, if consumers knew that 
an incident would occur, they may have made a different decision (Culnan and Armstrong 1999).  Expectations 
matter, and the consumer suffers when they are violated. In his taxonomy of privacy, Solove (2006) notes the legal 
and ethical distinction between mere data disclosure and a breach of confidentiality; the latter marks a violation of 
trust that entitles the victim to some recompense. 
Companies  
While responsibility for a privacy incident can rest with any data-controlling entity (see below), our analysis focuses 
largely on for-profit firms (other institutions may have a similar subset of consequences). The most immediate 
punishment for a privacy incident is a direct penalty from a governing institution. In the US, the Federal Trade 
Commission has jurisdiction in this area. The FTC can fine a firm responsible for breaches, or recommend 
expensive process overhauls to prevent future incidents. Choicepoint was forced to pay a $15 million fine (Federal 
Trade Commission [2006]). Often, however, the FTC does not fine the responsible firm (such as in the case of 
Petco, following a 2003 breach; Federal Trade Commission [2004]). Settlements usually do not require the company 
to admit responsibility, saving it from further liability. Yet, liability is another consequence of privacy incidents that 
can become significant. After a 2003 incident, BJ’s Inc. did not face fines, but several civil suits from affected 
banks, for a total of $13 million. BJ’s Inc itself sued IBM. In this case and others, the privacy incident affected client 
or partner firms and could, in the worst case, terminate the relationship. Finally, notification of affected consumers 
and accompanying recovery assistance such as a hotline represents non trivial expenses.  
Beyond the immediate costs, a privacy incident can create long term indirect consequences. Privacy has been 
identified as a principle component of trust (Camp [2003]) and vice versa (Ponemon [2003]). An incident can 
damage a customer or partner relationship built on trust. Ponemon [2005] claims that consumers retain a negative 
impression of responsible firms and will alter their consumption patterns, although it must be verified whether 
survey data of this sort can capture actual behavior. Still, a firm might face higher insurance premia for liability after 
a breach, and future business partners might be less inclined to trust the firm.  
 
Quantifying Privacy Consequences  
Identifying consequences of a privacy incident is difficult enough, but quantifying these consequences is remarkably 
complex. Gellman [2002] argues that studies of privacy losses tend to understate the effects of privacy losses, while 
Lenard and Rubin [2005] and Cate [2005] argue that many estimates are overstated. There is no, in short, consensus 
about estimated costs, or even the best method (Svensson [2003]). None of the above-mentioned calculations 
includes the costs of preventing a privacy incident: the net effect of a breach remains an open question.  
A common simplifying tool employed throughout the literature is to use stock price as a proxy for the consequences 
of various events for a company. A potential decline in stock price is itself an adverse consequence of a privacy 
incident. Notwithstanding the known limitations of analyses based on such valuations of stock market prices (from 
the debated efficiencies of stock market, to the actual consequences of market oscillation that may be only 
temporary), it is of interest to contrast how the market reacts to privacy breaches, to its reaction to security breaches. 
The earlier examples of DoubleClick and ChoicePoint offer anecdotal evidence that stock price can reflect news of 
privacy incidents: in the two studies that are closest to ours, Garg et al.. [2003] use eight incidents to show that a 
breach of credit card information has a large negative effect on stock price, while a theft of customer information 
has a negligible impact; while Campbell et al.. [2003] find that 11 instances of attacks on confidential data (of which 
9 involved consumers’ data) have a statistically significant impact on a company’s evaluation.  
 
Consequences of Security versus Privacy Incidents  
 Acquisti et al./Cost of Privacy Breaches 
  
 Twenty-Seventh International Conference on Information Systems, Milwaukee 2006 1567 
While there is little work on economic costs of privacy breaches, more work has been done on economics costs of 
security breaches. Prior event study analyses on information security have focused on the change in market value of 
firms whose systems are breached (Cavusoglu et al.. [2002] and Kannan et al.. [2004]). These studies show that 
announcements of a security breach negatively impact the CAR (Cumulative Abnormal Return) of firms whose 
information systems have been breached. Campbell et al.. [2003], quoted above, conduct a similar event study and 
find that only the impact of confidentiality related security breaches is negative and significant, while the impact of 
non-confidentiality related security breaches is not significantly different from zero. Hovava and D’Arcy [2003] 
show similar results by finding that Denial of Service (DoS) type attacks are not associated with any significant loss 
in value for firms. Telang and Wattal [2006] show that software vendors suffer when vulnerabilities in their products 
are published in major newspapers.  
The motivation and results of this paper differ from the above work in three ways. First, the focus is explicitly 
centered on personal information, rather than the security product or corporate networks. Second, we use a broader 
categorization of the information security causes, extending outside conventional technical definitions of security to 
include organizational and human factors – and therefore also policy and business violations. Finally, we compile 
the largest dataset yet used to examine the economic effects of security risks, spanning many industrial sectors and 
including responsible third parties. This allows us to build a clearer model of the cost of privacy breaches. 
  
Hypotheses 
The previous literature on event studies and security breaches has shown that certain types of breaches negatively 
affect a company’s stock market valuation. Since privacy breaches can be associated with liability, fines, reputation, 
and other costs, we expect a similar impact: 
H1: A company suffers a loss in market value whenever a privacy breach is announced  
It is also possible to forecast, following Telang and Wattal [2006]’s findings, that in the case of privacy breaches the 
source of the announcement has an influence on the magnitude of the effect: 
H2: The magnitude of the negative CAR CAR (Cumulative Abnormal Return) will be larger whenever a privacy 
breach is reported in national media rather than local or industry outlets 
 
Because a company’s privacy costs may also depend on the number of individuals whose information has been 
compromised, we expect a monotonic relation between the number of affected parties and the stock market impact: 
 
H3: The magnitude of the negative CAR will be increasing with the number of individuals affected by the privacy 
breach 
 
In addition to the above hypothesis, there are other aspects of the relation between privacy breaches and stock 
market valuations that we intend to study. In particular: 
1. Whether a “privacy fatigue” is emerging, as the number of breaches grows and consumers’ attention 
possibly diminishes (in ongoing regression, we test whether breaches that took place after the ChoicePoint 
debacle are met by similar or different severity in the stock market) 
2. Whether privacy breaches determine similar or different reactions in the market place as security breaches. 
 
Privacy Breaches: Empirical Analysis 
Data: Breaches and publicly traded companies  
In order to study somewhat homogenous and comparable data, we focused our attention on data breaches, defined as 
instances in which consumer or other parties’ data was exposed through: 
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• Bad security practices 
• Hacker attacks 
• Insider attacks 
• Computer or data thefts 
• Lost data or equipment 
• Other (e.g. illegal sale or handling of individual data) 
 The exposure in question may have been caused by insider attacks, hacking, stolen or lost equipment, or voluntary 
but illegal sale of data. In addition, in order to perform an event study analysis, we only focused on publicly traded 
companies.1 To compile as complete a list of privacy incidents as possible, we mined and search for announcements 
of privacy breach events in news databases like Lexis-Nexis and ProQuest, as well as online compilations 
(Choicepoint, Inc [2006], Wall [2006], as well as mailing lists and dedicated blogs, such as Adam Shostack and 
Chris Walsh’s http://www.emergentchaos.com and http://attrition.org).  
For each event, we must determine the precise date announcement in order to look for a market response. Given the 
complex nature of the news cycle and how information propagates, it is not always immediately clear when a breach 
was announced. This is further complicated by the pattern of disclosure, where new developments sometimes 
modify (almost always increase) the scope of the initial announcement. When several companies were involved in a 
data breach , each company was treated as a separate event. We considered each event case by case, searching the 
Lexis-Nexis database of major papers, wire reports and popular Internet news sources. Several events had to be 
discarded because the sequence of publication dates or news propagation did not allow us to be confident about a 
certain event’s data. Since the model assumes that the event is the primary change in stock value during the event 
period, we abandoned a few event data when unrelated major announcements (such as earning projections or 
mergers) for the company of interest fell in a window of days close to the event day.  
After this cleaning, we were left with 79 breach events. The mean number of individuals affected by a breach was 
around 1 million, while the median breach disclosed 95,000 subjects’ data. Tables 1 to 4 provide some aggregate 
statistics about our dataset. 
 
Table 1. Distribution of Privacy Breaches in Publicly Traded Companies (NYSE and NASDAQ) by Year  
Year Number of incidents 
2000 4 
2001 4 
2002 1 
2003 3 
2004 3 
2005 51 
2006 (until March 1st) 13 
 
 
Table 2. Distribution of Privacy Breaches in Publicly Traded Companies (NYSE and NASDAQ) by Subject 
Exposed 
                                                          
1 We are, however, also gathering data about other forms of privacy breaches, as well as those affecting non-publicly 
traded companies. 
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Type of subject Number 
Customers 49 
Employees 10 
Third party data 18 
Other/undetermined 2 
 
 
 Each event in our data set was coded for a number of details present in most announcements.  Table 1 shows the 
distribution of reported occurrences across time. Note the sharp increase in 2005: a California state law mandating 
the report of data breaches affecting residents went into effect on January 1, 2005. (CITE)  The sudden increase of 
announced incidents suggests that it was only the rate public disclosure that rose, rather than the number of actual 
breaches. We also distinguish, in Table 2, among the subjects of the data disclosed, whether it referred to a firm’s 
customers, employees, or if the company had no direct relationship with the data subject.  The majority of breaches 
involve customer data, which could magnify reputation consequences. 
We further separate the announcements by cause of data breach.  Of course, these classifications are necessarily 
artificial, since each event has its own detail, and must use the information provided in the initial announcement.   
When a trusted party or an outside attacker is specifically mentioned, we label it as an insider or hacker attack, 
respectively. If the data was lost on stolen hardware, we note that as a separate attack, since the attacker could have 
valued the equipment rather than the data; when no evidence of theft is available, we simply note that the data is 
“lost”.  The category of “bad security practices” comprises a wide range of internal mistakes that allowed data to be 
accessed, whether faxing account data to a wrong number or failing to secure a sensitive Web page adequately. Most 
of the breaches are due to mishandling of security practices or data, or inappropriate physical defense against thieves 
(see Table 3). By themselves hackers’ attacks do not appear to be the main source of data problems in our sample.  
Gleaning the exact amount of personal data leaked in each breach is also hard from many breach announcements, 
although most offer some details. Social security numbers are the data more often compromised in these breaches, 
followed by credit card information (Table 4).   
Table 3. Distribution of Privacy Breaches in Publicly Traded Companies (NYSE and NASDAQ) by Type. 
Type of breach Number 
Bad security practices 24 
Hacker 9 
Insider attack 8 
Computer or hardware theft 18 
Lost data 12 
Other/undetermined 8 
 
Table 4. Distribution of Privacy Breaches in Publicly Traded Companies (NYSE and NASDAQ) by Type of 
Information Exposed. 
Type of information Number 
SSN 41 
Credit card 18 
Complete credit record 9 
Other personal information 10 
Other/undetermined 1 
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Event Studies  
To measure the economic costs of privacy breaches to a firm, we adopted an event study methodology. Our 
methodology follows closely from prior event study analysis. The implicit assumption in this methodology is that 
the financial markets respond to news that affect a security’s value, so change in stock price is a good proxy for the 
impact of a given event. Campbell et al.. [2003] present an useful summary of the event study analysis highlighting 
the history as well as the commonly followed methodologies. Event study methodologies are well accepted for 
studying the implications of public announcements on stock prices. Hendricks and Singhal [1997] study the impact 
of quality award winning announcements on the market value of firms and observe positive abnormal returns 
generated by winning a quality award. They further note that awards given by independent organizations and 
announcements by small firms are more likely to have a significant impact on the firms’ market value.  
In an event study approach, the stock price of the firm is explained by the event after controlling for trends and 
volatility. In particular, if a firm suffers from privacy breach then it may incur financial losses (fines and penalty, 
loss of reputation) which should reflect in its stock price. Thus, stock prices on the days surrounding the event can 
capture the impact of that event and measure the economic cost of such privacy incidents.  
 
Models  
We use the standard event study methodology for this analysis. An event study assumes that returns on a stock are 
significantly impacted by an event of interest (in our case, the event of interest is the vulnerability disclosure 
announcement). The period of interest for which we observe the event is known as the event window. The smallest 
event window is one day (day of the announcement or day ’0’).2 In practice, the event window is often expanded to 
include two days (day 0 and day 1)3 to capture the effect of price announcements made after the close of the markets 
on a particular day. Sometimes researchers include a day before the announcements to incorporate any information 
leaks about the event.  
 
In our study we focus on a one-day event window (day 0). Hendricks and Singhal [1996] cite two reasons to use a 
one-day event period. First, a shorter event period permits a better estimation of the effects of information of stock 
prices since it reduces the possibility of other confounding factors not related to the announcement. Second, it also 
increases the power of the statistical tests. Abnormal returns are defined as the difference between the actual return 
of the stock over the event window minus the expected return of the stock over the event window. To compensate 
for a delay in the news cycle and to understand the long term effects, we also examine a short period following the 
event day.  
The expected return on the stock is calculated in several ways, but in our analysis we focus on the market model, 
which assumes a stable linear relation between the market return and the return on the stock. We also verify our 
results using other methods such as the market-adjusted method and the mean-adjusted method. The coefficients of 
the linear model are calculated by choosing a portion of the data as the estimation window. The estimation window 
closely precedes the event window. In our case, we use standard estimation window of 92 actual trading days (more 
than 120 solar days), from day -100 to day -8. There are three main methods followed in the event study 
methodology (Campell et al.. [1997], Hendricks and Singhal [1996]) to estimate the abnormal returns.  
 
The Market Model  
In the market model, the abnormal returns are estimated as follows:  
ARit = Rit − αi − βiRmt (1)  
                                                          
2 If an announcement is made on a day when the markets are closed, we consider the next day when the markets 
open as day 0. 
3 Day 1 is the day after the announcement. 
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Rit for a stock is the percent change in the stock price at time t, (Pit −Pit−1)/Pit−1, where i denotes the event (i=1,2, 
…N), m denotes the market, and t denotes the day of the event (e.g. t = 0 denotes the day of the vulnerability 
announcement.). ARit denotes the abnormal return of event i at time t, Rit denotes the actual return and Rmt denotes 
the market return at time period t. The abnormal return is defined as the difference between the actual return and the 
normal return. This is the part of the actual return that cannot be explained by market movements and captures the 
effect of the event. Depending on whether the stock of interest was traded on NASDAQ or NYSE, we used the 
appropriate market index. We use ordinary least squares regression to estimate the coefficients for the above 
regression.  
The quantities of interest for general analysis are the day-specific average returns and aggregate returns over time. 
The mean abnormal return is the mean across all observations on day t of the event. The cumulative abnormal return 
for the event CAR is defined as the sum of the abnormal returns over the event window.  
 
The Market Adjusted Model  
In this model, the event window returns are compared to an expected return of the market only over the event 
period, so the abnormal returns are given as:  
ARit = Rit − Rmt (2)  
where the terms have the usual meaning as in the Market Model.  
 
The Mean Adjusted Model  
In this case, the returns are compared to the mean market return over the event period. Abnormal returns are now 
given as:  
ARit = Rit − Ri (3)  
where Ri  is the mean return on the stock which made a vulnerability announcement during event i, over the duration 
of the estimation period (in our study,  that means 92 days).  
Test Statistics  
Brown and Warner [1985] have presented a comprehensive analysis of suitable test statistics for the abnormal mean 
return. Similarly to the security case, since data breaches may have been disclosed by more than one company on a 
given day, our statistics should allow for event day clustering. A t statistic proposed by Brown and Warner [1985] 
takes in to account event day clustering and cross-sectional dependence in the security specific excess returns (see 
also Telang and Wattal [2006]):  
2
A
t
S
At =           (4) 
where 





−
−
= ∑
=
T
s
sA AAT
S
1
2 )(
1
1
 and T is the number of days in the estimation period and 





= ∑
=
T
s
sAT
A
1
1
  
The null hypothesis is that the abnormal returns are not significantly different from zero. Under the null hypothesis, 
the abnormal returns are independent and identically distributed and normal with a mean of zero and the variance 
given by the variance of abnormal returns over the estimation period.   
 
Event Study Results  
We present here the results of the event study. After cleaning the data, we focused on 79 events and an estimation 
window from t −100 to t −8. The forecast window was from t −7 to t +10.  
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Figure 1. Mean Abnormal Returns from t −7 to t +10 after the Event  
To strengthen our results, we tested all the three models discussed above (market model, market adjusted, and mean 
adjusted) and we calculated both mean and median values as well as percentages of negative abnormal returns on 
event day. We performed parametric and non parametric tests to evaluate our results.  
Figure 1 summarizes the abnormal return values over the t −7 to t +10 window (again, t0 is the event day ¬the day 
when the data breach was announced). The negative values on t 0 are the largest and most significant in the window 
considered. After that, the values start increasing and the abnormal return become positive on t 3.  
Table 5 pins down specific values for the CAR on event day (which is identical to the abnormal returns on that day). 
The different models give comparable results highlighting the mild (around half percent) negative impact of 
breaches announcements on the companies’ stock prices.  
Figure 2 presents the actual cumulative results, or the accumulated difference between the breached companies and 
the projected market returns, starting at t -5. From this figure, the sudden drop in returns from the event  
Table 5. Cumulative Abnormal Returns on Event Day (t values in parentheses)  
 
CAR t=0  Market Model  Market Adjusted Model  Mean Model 
Mean Abnormal Return  0.41 (1.97)  0.52 (2.45)  0.35 (1.62) 
Median Abnormal Return  0.22  0.26  0.15  
Percentage below zero  58%  58%  59%  
is more evident. Starting on day +2, however, positive abnormal returns increase the CAR. The values after that 
point become positive but no longer significant (see also Table 6).   
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Table 6. Cumulative Abnormal Returns over Different Periods  (double star represents significance at the 0.05 
level) 
Day -1 0 0 to 1 0 to 2 0 to 5 0 to 10 
CAR 0.03 -0.41** -0.58** -0.46 0.21 1.3 
 
Discussion  
Data breaches seem to have a moderate but statistically significant negative impact on a firm's value, as determined 
by the larger financial market. The day prior to the event the mean abnormal return is positive. On the even day and 
the day after, the mean abnormal return is negative and reaches cumulatively a value close to -0.6%. These values 
are robust under different model specifications. The mean single day loss of 0.4% represents a large expected drop 
in market value, as the average firm loses 0.4% of its value from day t -1. 
The differences between the mean and median abnormal return values deserves further attention. On the event day, 
both the statistics are negative and significant. However, the mean values tend to be systematically higher than the 
median ones. This suggests the presence of strong outliers that are driving some of the negative performance after 
the announcement of a breach. However, the percentage of negative abnormal return for a firm object of such 
announcements is well above 50% (from 58% to 59% depending on the model adopted).  
 
 
Figure 2. CAR Values from t −5 to t +10 after the Event 
Security and Assurance 
1574 Twenty-Seventh International Conference on Information Systems, Milwaukee 2006  
 
In theory, this should be a net loss of over $140 million. However, looking at each company’s abnormal returns and 
applying that difference to each firms' market value produce an estimate of only $9,953,968. Clearly, some firms 
with large market capitalizations do not suffer as strong adverse effects from an announcement. This somewhat 
surprising finding suggests that the penalty for a privacy breach may be an anticipation of an absolute value of 
consequences, which would hurt smaller companies more. A preliminary exploration does not strongly support this 
hypothesis, since AR is barely correlated with capitalization value (cc=0.08), even when compared to the correlation 
between AR and stock price (cc=0.18). Future work to explore this question is discussed below.  
An aspect of this study that deserves more attention is how the impact of announcements changes over time. 
Anecdotally, companies like ChoicePoint and DoubleClick have suffered well after the first initial day following the 
announcement, and some of their worst losses have appeared even a few days later. This is possibly related to the 
fact that data breaches tend to be more confusing - their magnitude, implications, and nature are more complicated 
and often not immediately tractable - than ‘pure’ security breaches. For this reason it is possible both that the media 
keeps infusing new information into the market place, but also that the marketplace takes more time to evaluate and 
incorporate those news into market prices than in presence of security breaches.   
 
To better understand why the market reacts to privacy breaches, we examine a range of factors. Looking at each 
attribute alone, in Table 7, it appears that retail firms suffer more and to a greater degree.  This could be explained 
from the reputation effect. Note that switching costs are often lower from one retailer to another than other consumer 
firms (i.e., banks), so the privacy reputation of a consumer goods merchant could drive away more business than a 
financial institution, even if the stakes are higher. If the breach announcement had evidence of a malicious actor 
deliberately trying to access data, the negative effect of the breach is higher, while if a third-party company (such as 
a data processor) can be blamed for the breach, the market appears to react more favorably. Both of these results 
conform to what one might expect. The number of victims looks to be correlated with a negative market reaction, 
but only for very large data breaches.    
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Table 7.  Cumulative Aabnormal Returns (Day 0) by Industry, Type of Breach, Subject, Responsibility, 
Cause, and Numbers Affected 
 
 
Further exploration in figure 3 highlights what appears to be a small size effect.  The data itself is quite noisy, 
however, and the linear relationship is a poor fit. Still, this finding offers some small support for our third 
hypothesis, which argues that the CAR should be a function of privacy costs, which in turn should be a function of 
the number of individuals affected. One could also anticipate a time effect. Either investors become inured to the 
problem of data breaches, or concern is compounded as companies fail to learn from each others mistakes. Privacy 
theory does not offer much guidance between these two alternatives, and the data is equally ambiguous, as the 
passage of time appears to have very little effect on abnormal stock returns (figure 4).  The absence of a time effect 
allows us to confidently use the full data sample in the following analysis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Larger Breaches Appear to Have a Negative Effect 
# % Negative
Industry Retail -0.01570 14 71.43%
Other -0.00206 24 66.67%
Finance 0.00048 26 53.85%
Data processor -0.00509 14 28.57%
Data Misuse Attack evidence -0.00870 33 57.58%
No attack evidence -0.00104 41 65.85%
Data Subject Third party -0.00597 17 64.71%
Employee 0.00186 10 60.00%
Customer -0.00459 51 54.90%
Responsibility Third party responsible 0.00158 17 23.53%
Breach Cause Laptop / tape -0.00286 29 65.52%
Hacker / insider -0.01098 17 47.06%
Bad security practices -0.00112 24 62.50%
# Affected Less than 100,000 0.00202 31 54.84%
100,000-500,000 -0.00458 22 54.55%
More than 500,000 -0.02656 9 77.78%
y = -0.0019x + 0.0063
R2 = 0.0507
-0.03
-0.02
-0.01
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Log (# victims)
A
R
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Figure 4: There Does not Appear to Be a Time Effect 
 
Regression Analysis 
The data presented above suggests a high level of variation across observed privacy incidents, and what could 
explain it.  Of course, simple tabulated data could fail to account for a variety of competing factors. We use a simple 
regression model to examine whether any feature of the breaches can predict the market reaction. Both the nature of 
the firm and the details of the breach could affect how investors viewed the event. Table 8 summarizes a regression 
model predicting that abnormal returns on Day 0 are a function of the number of victims of a breach, whether the 
breach was announced in a major paper or news wire, the industry of the firm involved, whether the breach was 
announced clearly as part of a malicious attempt to gain access to data, the subject of the data, whether a third party 
(outside the company) was responsible for the security failure and measure of the company’s size, in market 
capitalization. This same model is also used to test factors predicting the change in total value of each stock.  
 
 
Table 8. Regression Analysis 
 Abnormal returns   Change in total market value 
  Linear coeff Std Err   Linear Coeff Std Err 
Intercept -7.690 4.112  866.11 925.89 
      
y = 1E-05x - 0.5419
R2 = 0.0233
-0.03
-0.02
-0.01
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
02/13/05 04/04/05 05/24/05 07/13/05 09/01/05 10/21/05 12/10/05 01/29/06
Date
AR
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Breach with > 100,000 subjects * -1.203 0.670  -143.75 150.77 
      
Reported in major paper or wire service 0.052 0.760  269.63 171.14 
      
Firm Sector: retail -0.458 0.992  -201.03 223.39 
Firm Sector: finance 0.191 0.884  78.22 198.95 
Firm Sector: data processor 0.139 1.130  -160.63 254.36 
      
Breach as part of an active attack to get data -0.388 0.680  -39.83 153.20 
      
Data subject: Customer -0.123 1.073  -58.91 241.53 
Data subject: Employee -0.154 1.260  14.87 283.77 
      
Responsibility for breach attributed to 3rd party 0.335 0.819  71.18 184.36 
      
Company size: log(total stock value) ** 0.803 0.398   -96.06 89.62 
Abnormal returns measured in percentage points, change in market capitalization measured in $ millions. Firm 
sector 
reference: “other”; data subject reference: “third party”. * p > .1, ** p > .05  
 
When all firm and breach attributes are included, very few of the variables have any significant predictive power. 
There is scant support for hypothesis 2, since the channel of initial report has no effect on the size of abnormal 
return or change in market value. Our third hypothesis, however, looks promising. Controlling for other factors, a 
breach of more than 100,000 subjects will reduce the return on stock price by 1.2% (p = .077).  On the other hand, 
the larger a company is, the less impact a data breach will have, with each order of magnitude in total market 
capitalization increasing the expected return on the event to increase by .8% (p=047).  None of the other variables 
have significant predictive power, nor do any of the parameters in the market value model.  Neither industry, data 
subject, nor breach responsibility is indicative of how the market will react. Interestingly, there was also no market 
response about whether the announcement indicated that the breach was part of an active attack to get the data. 
Several methods of measuring a time effect were also added to the model without significant effect. As we continue 
to add to the dataset and identify outliers or inappropriate data, we hope to further refine this these regression 
models to better understand why the market responds differently to similar privacy incidents. 
 
Comparison with other Event Studies 
Any model is dependent on the underlying assumptions, and the conclusions of this paper are dependent on a theory 
of firm valuation through market reaction. These methods have been used to study a variety of phenomena related 
information technology and consumer trust. We present a summary these studies’ findings in comparison to this 
paper in table 9. The impact of privacy breaches of stock market valuations is somewhat less than that observed for 
security vulnerabilities (from viruses, to hacking, to exploits discovered in applications). This difference may signal 
a different market perception, and possibly a discounting of the consequences of incidents that directly compromise 
consumers’ data compared to those that affect consumers or corporations through viruses, denial-of-service attacks, 
and software vulnerabilities, and calls for further investigation. Still, our findings are within an order of magnitude 
of recent studies on the negative effects of vulnerability disclosure (Telang and Wattal 2004) and one study on 
security breach disclusure (Kannan, Rees  and Sridhar 2004), as well as the positive effects of a quality award 
(Hendricks and Singhal 1996). This latter comparison might validate the underlying theory that a privacy breach 
might indicate a shift in reputation and trust. 
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Table 7. Summary of Related Event Studies 
Classification of 
Event Study  
Authors  Time Period  CAR  
Impact of a Data 
Breaches on Firms 
Acquisti, A, Friedman, A, and Telang R 2000-2005 -.58 
Impact of 
Vulnerability 
Disclosures on 
Software Vendors  
Telang R and S Wattal (2004)  1999-2004  -0.65%  
 
Campbell K, Gordon LA, Loeb MP and L Zhou 
(2003) (Only confidential events involving personal 
data) 
1995-2000 -5.4% 
Campbell K, Gordon LA, Loeb MP and L Zhou 
(2003)  
1995-2000  -1.9%* 
Cavusoglu H, Mishra B and S Raghunathan (2004)  1998-2000  -2.1%  
Hovav A and J D’Arcy (2003)  1998-2002  Not 
Significant  
Impact of Security 
Breaches on Firms  
Kannan K, Rees J and S Sridhar (2004)  1997-2003  -0.73%  
Jarrell G and S Peltzman (1985)  1967-1981  -0.81%  
(for auto)  
Impact of Product 
Recall 
Announcements  
Davidson WL III and DL Worrell (1992)  1968-1987  -0.36%  
(day -1)  
Chatterjee D, Richardson VJ and RW Zmud (2001)  1987-1998  1.16%  
Im KS, Dow KE and V Grover (2001)  1981-1996  Not 
Significant 
Subramani M and E Walden (2001)  Oct 1998- Dec 
1998  
7.5%  
Impact of IT 
Investment 
Announcements  
Dos Santos BL, Peffers K and DC Mauer (1993)  1981-1988  1%  
Impact of Winning 
a Quality Award  
Hendricks KB and Singhal VR (1997)  1985-1991  0.59%  
*Not significant at the 10% level 
 
Conclusions 
We have presented the first comprehensive analysis of the impact of a company’s privacy incidents on its market 
value.  
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We have accumulated privacy incidents and breach data from different sources for the 1999-2006 (until March) 
period. Our event study shows that there exists an impact for privacy violations. This impact is significant and 
negative, although it is short-lived. The difference in our mean and median results suggests that a number of 
outlying firms are driving significant portion of the negative results. One possible explanation is that larger firms not 
only are more visible, but their trust reputation, built over time, can be more significantly affected by negative 
reports about their privacy practices.  
In order to further study this conjecture, our current research is expanding the regression analysis to examine the 
determinants of firm-specific stock returns and to understand and contrast the impact of “pure” security breaches 
compared to privacy ones. Specifically, we are testing the relation between abnormal returns, breach 
announcements, and a number of factors including channel of announcement, type of company, attack, and data 
breached, and severity of the breach. Obviously, we are limited by a small sample, but we are monitoring current 
breaches as they develop to extend our dataset. The longitudinal nature of this data enables us to detect time trends, 
to determine whether regular announcements generate privacy fatigue or if a standard develops to punish those who 
fail to safeguard personal information after several years of disclosure.  
We also plan to be able to further study empirically the implications of privacy violations that go beyond their stock 
market influence and that include non-breach related invasions - such as intrusive policies or faulty services in the 
realm of personal information. This empirical research agenda not only will advance the understanding of the 
economics of privacy but provide data to inform future policy decisions.   
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